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Book Review 
Jill Graper Hernandez, Gabriel Marcel’s Ethics of Hope: 
Evil, God and Virtue (London: Continuum, 2011), 176 pp. 
Gabriel Marcel’s Ethics of Hope “responds to the need for an existentialist 
ethics based on Marcel’s philosophy of presence…” (1). Author Jill 
Hernandez argues that Marcel’s existentialism is one that is essentially 
moral, and that this moral core is tied to the fact that the perspective of the 
Other functions as the basis for moral decision making in Marcel’s work (2). 
Chapter one outlines the nature of the “problematic man,” the person 
characterized by the desire to possess rather than the desire to be. The 
author connects the problematic not only to a functional way of being in the 
world, but also to a commitment to materialism. Her aim is to suggest that 
this commitment to materialism is the source, or perhaps a source, of moral 
evil in the world (5). When we become obsessed with objects, slaves to 
things, it degrades our ability to be moral agents. 
The problematic and functionalized way of existing is connected to the 
state of despair. Faced with death—the death of God and, ultimately, our 
own death—a world comprised of only things is, the author suggests 
following Marcel, a world devoid of meaning. If others and, ultimately, we 
are nothing more than complex objects, organic machines for performing a 
variety of functions, then the value of persons ceases when they are no 
longer able to perform their functions (17, 19). It is because “unavailability 
creates relationships of function rather than value, [that] Marcel equates 
indisponibilité with a crippling moral evil” (22). In the face of death and 
despair we cannot derive meaning from things, and can only be saved by 
what the author intriguingly calls the “relational turn” (12): “The most 
mysterious aspect of our being is our propensity to love, and it is love that 
can foster hope because love attempts to transcend death” (13). 
Chapter two focuses on the implications of the “death of God” and its 
relation to moral life, problematic life, and materialism. Hernandez outlines 
Marcel’s engagement with three different atheists: Nietzsche, Sartre, and 
Camus. Nietzsche’s atheism is grounded in a deep appreciation of the loss 
represented by the death of God. Sartre, in contrast, is someone for whom 
God was never significant, and so he remained oblivious to his own role in 
the death of God and insensitive to the existential significance of the 
Nietzschean proclamation. For Camus, in contrast to Nietzsche and Sartre, 
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the death of God was deeply intertwined with the problem of evil, 
particularly as evident in the suffering of children. In a sense, Camus shares 
some of Marcel’s concern for the Other (41). This third engagement weighs 
heavily on Marcel, for whom the problem of evil is a genuine existential 
problem. The problem of evil, in turn, can lead people to a sort of spiritual 
numbness or death, a “lived atheism” (42) based not on propositions about 
God’s (non)existence, but rather on lived experience (51). 
If the death of God leaves us with insolvable difficulties, whether we 
are atheists or theists, redemption is nevertheless possible in 
intersubjectivity, through which we may break from problematic 
materialism and salvage “a meaningful existence tied to community and 
evidenced in a life of hope” (52). 
Chapter three bridges the discussion of moral and the account of 
personal and communal crises in the later chapters through a discussion of 
hope. Hope, the author argues, is distinguished by two significant criteria. 
First, it is “choral”; that is to say, hope always involves others and 
constitutes itself “through a we and for a we” (64). Second, hope is distinct 
from “mere wishing” and is related to “creating possibilities” that “an agent 
can bring about.” Thus, hope combats despair by actively creating options 
for the subject. 
Chapter four develops an intriguing account of the role of technology in 
materialism, disconnection, and problematicity. Technology itself is morally 
and existentially benign (75), or perhaps neutral. However, there is a 
tendency for technology to lead to materialism and even idolatry. It can also 
lead people to hide from or escape the reality of relationships with other 
people and with non-human entities like the environment, and in so doing 
devalue them. This argument puts Marcel in dialogue with a lively 
contemporary debate about the nature, promise, and dangers of technology. 
Hernandez argues that, for Marcel, technology is only a tool. Our focus 
should rather be on an ethical life of virtue, expressed in fidelity and 
availability (disponibilité) to others, and in hope. 
Chapter five continues the engaging work of chapter four by applying 
Marcel’s ethics to global crises such as war, civil injustices, and 
unemployment. Professor Hernandez demonstrates that the ethical life, on 
Marcel’s view, must be socially and politically engaged. The philosopher is 
called upon to create possibilities that foster change and hope in the world. 
Applied to social or global crises, this has to do with preserving a place for 
human value that will, in turn, allay fear and encourage people to act 
creatively (115). 
Overall, Gabriel Marcel’s Ethics of Hope is a competent contribution to 
scholarship on a figure whose sadly ignored work could shed considerable 
light on a number of contemporary philosophical debates. Perhaps its most 
welcome contribution is the perceptive way in which it links Marcel’s 
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philosophy of presence, availability, and hope to “applied” issues such as 
technology, civil rights, poverty and unemployment, and war. As Professor 
Hernandez notes, Marcel’s own thinking was in a sense fundamentally 
normative (1). Connecting the theoretical arguments of philosophy to these 
concrete ethical issues is certainly something worth pursuing and definitely 
something squarely in the spirit of Marcel’s own thinking; Professor 
Hernandez’s efforts in advancing this engagement will no doubt be 
welcome.  
There are issues that could do with further clarification. For example, 
despite the engagement with the concrete, we never get a solid sense of what 
Marcel’s philosophy enjoins us, as humans or as philosophers, to do. What 
exactly does it mean to “create possibilities”? Are these existential 
possibilities, or concrete possibilities? In what sense can the subject or agent 
bring these possibilities about, especially possibilities of the latter sort (65)? 
The ability of hope to “create possibilities” is a central theme of the work, 
but the text is not always clear on these issues. How should the philosopher 
respond to the various ethical crises Hernandez engages? What does it mean 
to “deny, as forcibly as possible” (107), to “actively sympathize” (107), to 
“take an active stand” (108), to “[refocus] political and social debate back to 
values” (110), or to “remind people of the experiences that are left behind in 
memories” (120)? Near the very end of the book Hernandez suggests the 
philosopher might “promote activity in the community in which she lives… 
engaging with students, fostering dialogue, participating in non-
governmental secular and religious groups” (132). However, while this is a 
welcome, if brief, clarification, it doesn’t sound too different from the way in 
which many contemporary philosophers do in fact behave: talking to 
students, writing op-ed pieces, participating in academic, social, and 
religious venues. One might suggest that contemporary philosophers could 
more fully embrace Marcel’s call to disponibilité, presence, fidelity, and hope; 
but since those are ways of being to which all persons are called, they don’t 
seem to suggest anything particular about how philosophers should 
concretely proceed in their social and political lives. It may be the case that 
Marcel’s social thought is not a full social philosophy (110), but one might 
hope for a bit more detail in this regard. 
The introduction to the book promises to show that “Marcel’s 
theoretical ethics are relevant to contemporary analytic ethics” (1), but it 
never fully delivers on this count. As my own training is largely continental, 
I may have missed more subtle references; however, there are few explicit 
and no sustained engagements with contemporary analytic philosophy. 
Three examples, each very brief, include a discussion of Stephen Darwall’s 
ethics of welfare (101), the fact that analytic ethics has traditionally had 
difficulty establishing how others could be the seat of the moral 
permissibility of actions (105), and the mention of Amartya Sen’s work on 
global welfare (130). 
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Finally, the book does suffer from passages that are awkward or 
misleading. Some of these passages are the result of grammatical slips, but 
others are more significant and accidentally misrepresent core philosophical 
points, as when we read:“Nietzsche’s ‘beyond’ becomes a ‘beneath’; his way 
up is, in practice, a way down: not a transcendence of ordinary moral 
categories but, to use a word coined by Jean Wahl, a transcendence from 
them” (44). Here the second instance of “transcendence” makes no sense and 
was no doubt meant to read “transdescendance,” and the slip is confusing. 
Likewise, “Marcel thinks that mysteries are a type of problem (and so, we 
attempt to solve them)” leads the reader to believe the mysterious is a subset 
of the problematic when, in fact, Marcel insists that the mysterious is other 
than problematic (100). Other examples exist and, in general, one gets the 
impression that certain parts of the book could have been more carefully 
edited. 
Nevertheless, Gabriel Marcel’s Ethics of Hope provides the reader with 
substantial food for thought, and works to expressly engage Marcel’s 
philosophy with contemporary ethical issues. It is a welcome addition to 
scholarship on Marcel’s lamentably neglected philosophy, and will certainly 
be of use to scholars interested in Marcel’s work.  
Brian Treanor 
Loyola Marymount University 
